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LEASING FARM
PROPERTY
by Neil E. Harl*
The rules governing the leasing of
farm and ranch property have gone through
an enormous transformation over the past
20 years.1  In the 1970s, the Internal
Revenue Service developed a set of
guidelines for distinguishing leases from
various kinds of purchase arrangements.2
Those authorities gave way to "safe harbor"
leasing in 1981 and "farm finance" leases in
1982.  Those provisions have now been
repealed or have expired so that the
determination of what is a lease is governed
by pre-1981 law.
Rules applicable in 1981-87.  As
part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Congress enacted a relaxed set of
rules for characterizing arrangements as
leases or purchase arrangements.3  Under
those provisions, a corporate lessor could
enter into a lease arrangement that treated
the lessor as the owner of the property for
purposes of claiming cost recovery deduc-
tions and investment tax credit.4  Dubbed
"safe harbor" leasing, the 1981 rules led to
widespread abuse and were amended
substantially in 1982.5  The 1982 legisla-
tion created a new concept, "finance leases"
and repealed, with some exceptions, safe
harbor leasing effective for leases entered
into after December 31, 1983.  The Tax
Reform Act of 1984 postponed, for four
years, the effective date for finance lease
rules and extended the farm finance lease
provisions through 1987.6  The finance
lease rules were finally repealed in 1986,
except for transitional rules, which contin-
ued farm finance lease provisions through
1987.7   Since 1987, leases have been sub-
ject to the pre-1981 rules.
*Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor
in Agriculture and Professor of Economics,
Iowa State University;Member of the Iowa
Bar.
Rules applicable since 1987.  As
indicated, repeal of the finance lease provi-
sions returned leasing to the pre-1981
guidelines.  Before enactment of the safe
harbor and finance lease provisions, prop-
erty leasing took place under rules less cer-
tain and less well-defined than the statutory
concepts enacted in the 1980s.  The pre-
1981 rules emphasized the economic sub-
stance of lease arrangements.  To be charac-
terized as a lease, the arrangement had to
be, in substance, a lease and not a mere fi-
nancing arrangement or some type of condi-
tional sale.  An important motive for
leasing, historically,has been that the an-
nual lease deduction may exceed the sum of
annual deductions for depreciation, interest,
repairs, taxes and insurance, which are al-
lowable in a purchase transaction.  Hence,
taxpayers have been motivated to enter into
arrangements that were denominated leases
but in reality were  camouflaged sales.
The Internal Revenue Service, over several
years, had provided several guidelines for
determining whether arrangements would be
characterized for federal income tax pur-
poses as leases8—
• The lessor must have a 20 percent
unconditional at-risk investment in the
property.9   That minimum investment
must be maintained throughout the
lease term and exist at the end of the
lease.10
•  Neither the lessee nor a party related
to the lessee may furnish any part of the
cost of the property.11   The only
exception is for improvements or addi-
tions by the lessee that could be readily
removed without causing material dam-
age to the property.12
•  The lessee may not loan to the lessor
any of the funds necessary to purchase
the property or guarantee any lessor
loan.13  A guarantee by the lessee of the
lessee's obligation to pay rent, properly
maintain the property or pay insurance
premiums or other conventional obliga-
tions of a net lease does not constitute
the guarantee of indebtedness of the
lessor.14
•  The lessee may not have an option to
purchase the property at the end of the
lease term except at fair market value at
the time the right is exercised and the
lessor may not require the lessee or any-
one else to purchase the property even
at fair market value.15  IRS has taken
the position that a provision that
permits the lessor to abandon the prop-
erty to any party is treated as a contrac-
tual right of the lessor to cause the
property to purchase the property.16
Thus, such a provision could preclude
an arrangement being treated as a lease.
This condition is easily the most seri-
ous limitation on drafting leases.  Many
lessees want a firm assurance that all or a
substantial part of the lease payments will
be credited on the purchase price for the
leased property.
•  The lessor must expect to receive a
profit and a positive cash flow from the
transaction independent of tax
benefits.17
•  Property that is usable only by the
lessee (limited use property) may not be
eligible for lease treatment.18   IRS will
not issue advance rulings on whether
certain transactions purporting to be
leases of property are leases for federal
income tax purposes where the property
is limited use property.
The concern of IRS is that, for limited
use property, there will probably be no po-
tential purchasers or lessees at the end of
the lease term other than the lessee who has
been leasing the property;19  therefore, the
lessee is assured of the benefits of the prop-
erty over the entire useful life of the
property.
Trades of property for leased re-
placements.  Frequently, a farmer or
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rancher wishing to lease a piece of equip-
ment has an item to trade in.  This can cre-
ate significant income tax problems if han-
dled as a single transaction – a trade in of
the used item and a leasing of the replace-
ment.
The problem is that a trade is a tax-free
exchange only if it is "held for productive
use in a trade or business or for invest-
ment" and is exchanged "solely for property
of like kind."20   An exchange of a tractor
for the lease of a replacement tractor, for
example, does not appear to be a like kind
exchange.21  Therefore, a trade of a used
tractor for a lease of a replacement tractor is
likely to be treated as a sale of the used
tractor and a lease of the replacement.  Such
a characterization would require recognition
of gain or loss, recapture of depreciation
and recapture of investment tax credit on
the trade in and a recalculation of the lease
payments for income tax purposes.  Quite
clearly, the better approach, at least from
the standpoint of simplicity, is to handle
such trades as two separate transactions –
(1) a sale of the used equipment to the
dealer and (2) a lease of the replacement
item.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
PREEMPTION OF STATE
EXEMPTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
PLANS BY ERISA
A number of cases have been published recently involving
the issue as to whether the  Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), preeempts state exemp-
tions for employment plans and prevents such exemptions from
being used at the state and federal levels.
The source of the issue is the U.S. Supreme Court case,
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d
836 (1988), which held that a Georgia anti-garnishment statute
was unconstitutional because the subject of the statute was pre-
empted by ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) .  The
Georgia statute expressly prohibited garnishments of ERISA
plans, except in the cases of alimony or child support.  Mackey,
however, did not involve a bankruptcy exemption.
Although one Texas Bankruptcy Court judge has ruled that
ERISA did not preempt the Texas exemption of ERISA plans, In
re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840 (W.D. Texas 1989) (Kel ly ,
B.J.) ,  other Texas Bankruptcy Court judges and  Arizona and
Mississippi Bankruptcy Courts have held state ERISA plan ex-
emptions preempted by ERISA based upon the ruling in Mackey.
In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex .
1989), aff'g point on rehear'g 93 B.R. 498 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1988) (Clark, B.J.); In re Flindall, 1 0 5
B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Larson, 1 0 2
B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re McLeod, 1 0 2
B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); In re Dyke, 9 9
B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
The issue of whether ERISA preempts employment plan
exemptions of other states has yet to be tried.  The U.S. Supreme
Court in Mackey stated:
"ERISA § 514(A) preempts 'any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan' covered by the statute."
ERISA governs:
"Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is
hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
by its express terms or as a result of surrounding cir-
cumstances such plan, fund or program–
"(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
"(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered em-
ployment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions
made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits
under the plan or the method of distributing benefits
from the plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
Under this broad definition and Mackey, most state employment
plan exemptions would be preempted by ERISA.
Note: Two courts have held that ERISA does not preempt
state IRA exemptions.  In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 8 5
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989)  (Texas IRA exemption not pre-
empted by ERISA); In re Martin, 102 B.R. 639 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1989)  (Tennessee IRA exemption not preempted
by ERISA).
Debtors have argued, without much success, that although
ERISA preempts state exemptions for employment pension
plans, ERISA itself is a federal exemption allowed under 11
